I suggest that it is useful to start with an analogy which compares safety on our roads with safety in the industrial environment. We can consider three main elements.
First consider the physical conditions concerned with vehicle driving. On the roads, we want the vehicles to be roadworthy with effective brakes, accurate steering, properly adjusted lights etc. We want the roads to have a surface with reasonable traction and without potholes; we want warning of unexpected bends, defined lanes, traffic lights, pedestrian crossings, etc. To achieve this we have mechanics to maintain vehicles and highway engineers to design and build suitable roads.
In our factories we also need to ensure that the physical conditions are suitable. Machines need to be in a safe condition, hazards need to be guarded, the physical layout should separate people from hazards and allow safe access and egress etc. We use maintenance departments, process engineers etc. to achieve this.
Secondly consider rules. On roads we have speed limits; defined ‘right of way’ at crossings and traffic lights; alcohol limits; prohibitions against herding cattle along motorways; limitations on where vehicles can be parked etc. Traffic policemen and traffic wardens enforce these rules – sometimes the rules are effectively enforced, sometimes not. In industrial situations we have rules regarding the wearing of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); the speed of fork lift trucks; alcohol limits etc. Our Supervisors enforce these rules… sometimes effectively, sometimes not!
The third consideration for safety on the roads is the behaviour and the skill of the driver. We need the drivers to understand the conditions and the risks as they vary from season to season, day to day and second to second. We also need the drivers to modify their behaviour as the risks and conditions vary.
We spend large amounts of money maintaining safe conditions and utilise much manpower enforcing rules but… these alone do not ensure either safe driving conditions or safe working environments. When driving, we will soon crash if we insist on obeying the speed rule without considerations of the speed of other traffic or the visibility, the weather conditions etc. However well our vehicle brakes are maintained, we cannot stop quickly on an icy road. We need more than just good road conditions, well maintained roads and well enforced rules. We need drivers to recognise and adapt to changing hazards. In an industrial environment, good working conditions and absolute compliance with rules will also not, by themselves, avoid all accidents
In developed countries, there is a requirement that drivers be trained and that they achieve a minimum standard of skill which is then tested. Despite this minimum skill requirement, driving behaviours continue to play a significant part in between 85 and 95 percent of all accidents. We also know that drivers who take advanced training have a significantly lower chance of an accident. This advanced training usually involves what is called ‘defensive driving’ which involves recognising potential risks and acting before the risks materialise (so avoiding the need to react to an emergency situation). Despite the effectiveness of defensive driving in reducing accidents, we spend very little time or money improving the skill of individual drivers beyond advertising the results of ‘drink driving’ and official poster campaigns exhorting us to ‘drive carefully’.
Typically in industry we do not even test the skill and risk awareness of our employees after we have ‘trained’ them. At its minimum, training may be restricted to “you start the machine like this; load the machine like this; unload like this and stop it like this… If you have problems come and see me… and be careful”.
Traditional safety training, even when carried out conscientiously over several hours or days is usually limited to explaining the safety rules, the PPE requirements; the processes which have hazardous emissions; the risks of electric shock; etc. This training is important but does not usually teach operators how to recognise the risks that their every day actions may pose (or how alternative actions can avoid those risks).
A few examples (from hundreds of possibilities) of these types of everyday risks include ‘lifting with a bent back’ (“because I have always done that and have never had a problem”); to ‘loading a part with fingers between the component and the grip’ (“because the light curtain will stop the machine moving”); or ‘driving when very tired’ (“I am experienced and careful”); or ‘not watching the hands while picking sharp components from a bin’ (“I have to work quickly to make more money”) etc.
If the training is detailed enough to explain the requirements of (for example, lifting and manual handling) the training seldom, if ever, coaches the required skills and systematically checks to ensure that the people trained understand the information well enough to apply the theory in practice. The training usually does not determine if, in practice, there are physical, social, cultural, intellectual or skill level barriers which prevent operators applying the theory.
Training is very importantbut, however thorough it is, it cannot predict and explain the correct actions for all possible situations that will be met. It is also impractical to formally coach all of the theoretical skills that would need to be applied to cover all eventualities.
To summarise the industrial safety situation described so far: Safety professionals and engineers have steadily improved the working conditions and environment; Supervision know the importance of enforcing safety legislation and rules; Training is often provided which explains the hazards; Despite these initiatives, operators continue to take risks for a variety of different reasons and these reasons are often not understood or addressed.
An effective Behavioural Safety Process can address this deficiency.
Anyone who has any experience of investigating accidents will be aware of the many so called ‘stupid errors’ that contribute to the final disaster.
These ‘stupid errors’ can, in fact, be defined, understood, observed and avoided. It is important to realise that we all take risks, often many risks every hour. We take risks for many reasons but usually because past experience has shown us that they do not always lead to injury. The experience of taking risks with no immediate injury then reinforces the belief that “it will not happen to me”. In addition, taking the risk also usually has some short term benefit. This short term benefit may be as insubstantial as saving a few seconds but it is a powerful influence because it is a predictable and immediate advantage. The severity of possible negative outcomes for any action only has a small influence compared with the immediacy and certainty of an expected, beneficial consequence. A simple but critical realisation is that reducing the number of risks that are taken for inconsequential gains will reduce the number of accidents.
An effective Behavioural safety process will define the risks present in the workplace. These risks are then defined as generic behaviours. These behaviours are then observed (usually by a few of the people who are exposed to the most risk – the operators). These observers require specialised training to help them to understand the critical behaviours, help them overcome resistance from the operators, record the necessary information etc. This is a job requiring significant ‘people skills’ and commitment but many who do undertake the challenge find significant personal satisfaction and become enthusiastic, long term, advocates for the behavioural safety process.
The observers’ role includes several different phases,
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Recognising the behaviours which are being done safely in a potentially hazardous situation
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Recognising the behaviours which are being carried out with risks.
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Engaging the operator in a discussion about what has been seen. The behaviours carried out safely are explained in some detail as a form of recognition and reinforcement. (Effective feedback and reinforcement for any desirable behaviour is an interesting subject in its own right. Suffice it to say that recognising safe behaviour should not be an embarrassing ‘cheer leading’ activity)
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Any risks seen are the subject of two way discussion.
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The reasons for the operator taking the risk is sought and the ‘barriers to safe behaviour’ determined (Was it difficult or impossible to do the behaviour safely, were there cultural pressures, personal factors, machine deficiencies etc)
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Possible solutions are discussed. These solutions may be a change in behaviour (when gloves are removed, place them in a pocket, not on the bench so that they are not forgotten when walking away), the solution may be to make it easier to work safely (place the load on an empty container so that no bending is required). The solution may be a suggestion for a future engineering or system change.
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Finally the observer should record the observation findings and the results of the discussion for analysis and possible follow up.
Another useful element of a successful BBS process involves training the operators and supervisors so that they understand the relationship between the risks that they take and the potential for accidents. More detailed training is also usually available for those who need to understand the underlying reasons that people take risks and the actions and changes that can be made to reduce the likelihood of risky behaviour.
Other non-measurable but significant benefits include, increased morale; genuine empowerment of the shop floor; improved ‘lines of communication’ between shop-floor and supervisory staff; more effective rules and rule enforcement (but often less severe punishments); etc.
To conclude, a good BBS process should not, in my opinion, be trained as yet more ‘Health and Safety’ restrictions but rather as a method to help us all find safer ways to work and play safely. The principles are equally valid if applied to sky-diving, mountain climbing, driving a vehicle or industrial operations!